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THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE AND THE 
IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT CLINTON: LAW 
AS A WEAPON FOR POLITICAL REFORM 
DANIEL H. ERSKINE, ESQ.∗ 
The age of revolution had just passed, the fires of war cooled, and the 
age of despotism or empire slowly ebbed to its demise. The giants of 
liberal democratic thinking were in their grey years and the voices of the 
greatest advocates ever to argue before the English bar had retired to 
quieter old age. The world was enlightened and into this atmosphere came 
the turbulent force of a Bill of Pains and Penalties—Englishmen were 
once again afire with a bygone age’s ambitions of unrestrained liberty. All 
that stood in the way was a portly King and his conservative ministers. 
Thus began the trial of Queen Caroline in the House of Lords. 
A few hundred years later in the former upstart colony, now the 
world’s sole superpower, industry flourished and technology expanded at 
the speed of the microprocessor. The worries of Soviet invasion and the 
spread of Communism were becoming pale memories, while the American 
nation saw a young man who hailed from an impoverished Arkansas 
homestead assume the highest elected office in the most powerful nation 
in the world. Once before, America had a youthful visage in the 
presidency who captivated a nation and led the country into an era of 
unprecedented legal reforms. Unfortunately, this self-avowed second 
Kennedy, after winning an unexpected second term, became embroiled in 
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a constitutional crisis only fully realized once before in the nation’s history 
immediately following the American Civil War. 
This work addresses the trial of Queen Caroline in the English House 
of Lords in 1820, and the impeachment in 1998 and trial in 1999 of 
President Clinton. Description of these two historical events provides a 
backdrop to discover how legal procedures, available only at the highest 
levels of government, are utilized as political weapons. The use of such 
procedures to instigate political change requires examination to discover 
why politicians elect to manipulate legal rules to effectuate this change. 
After uncovering why legal procedures are deliberately used as weapons to 
achieve political results, this article analyzes whether the law as a political 
weapon is an effective method to achieve political transformation.  
I. THE TRIALS OF QUEEN CAROLINE & PRESIDENT CLINTON 
A. Caroline, HRH Princess of Wales & Queen Consort of the United 
Kingdom 
The “whole story of Queen Caroline and her relations with her faithless 
and perjured husband is one of the most miserable in [English] history.”1 
With this ominous introduction comes a discussion of the events that so 
captivated a nation as to bring England to the brink of revolution. The 
following account of the trial of Queen Caroline is truncated to focus upon 
the political motivations for the initiation and continuance of the 
proceedings because others have more aptly and at greater length 
presented the historical account of this trial.2 The purpose of recounting 
the salient circumstances of the trial is to set the stage to evaluate the legal 
procedures utilized and to compare this event with that of the 
impeachment trial of President Clinton.  
1. The Prelude 
George, Prince of Wales and the future monarch of the British Empire, 
disliked his bride Caroline of Brunswick even at the moment of their 
 
 
 1. 2 G. BARNETT SMITH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT TOGETHER WITH AN ACCOUNT 
OF THE PARLIAMENTS OF SCOTLAND AND IRELAND 426 (London, Ward, Lock, Bowden & Co. 1892). 
 2. See generally 2 G. LATHOM BROWNE, NARRATIVES OF STATE TRIALS IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY: FIRST PERIOD, FROM THE UNION WITH IRELAND TO THE DEATH OF GEORGE THE FOURTH 
(2d ed. 1882); JANE ROBINS, THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE: THE SCANDALOUS AFFAIR THAT 
NEARLY ENDED A MONARCHY (2006); LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL, CAROLINE, THE UNHAPPY 
QUEEN (1962). 
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wedding in 1795.3 In exchange for the marriage, Parliament was to pay the 
“enormous debts” of this royal heir, but such payment was slow to occur, 
prompting the Prince to publicly insist upon Parliament’s promise.4 The 
Prime Minister denied any such promise was made to the Prince and 
forced upon the future monarch the payment of his debts from the income 
derived from land and other property previously bestowed upon the Prince 
through hereditary rights.5  
In 1796, one month after the birth of their only child, Prince George 
formally informed his wife by public letter that “intercourse between 
herself and the prince was in the future to be of a most restrictive nature 
. . . and a separation as to all conjugal relations” was to occur forever.6 
The separation sparked both widespread public and regal disapproval by 
King George III.7 The Prince and Princess, although physically separated, 
maintained a professional relationship between each other, which 
permitted the Princess to visit the royal palace as a “public personage.”8 
Yet, this placid tacit understanding shattered in 1806 when Prince George 
instituted a commission headed by the Lord Chancellor of England to 
ascertain whether rumors of the Princess’s infidelity were based on fact.9 
This “delicate investigation” acquitted the Princess of any infidelity in 
1807.10 During this time, “the public . . . warmly espoused her cause, for 
they were touched by her wrongs and disgusted with the conduct and 
character of her royal consort.”11  
Once the Prince severely restricted the Princess’s access to her child, 
Princess Charlotte, in 1813, a letter ostensibly from the Princess to the 
Prince was widely disseminated decrying the inhospitable manner of her 
exclusion from her child’s life.12 George responded by leaking the 
depositions taken during the “delicate investigation” describing Caroline’s 
alleged lurid sexual liaisons.13  
 
 
 3. BROWNE, supra note 2, at 345. 
 4. Id. at 345–46. 
 5. Id. 
 6. THOMAS HARRAL, HENRY THE EIGHTH AND GEORGE THE FOURTH; OR THE CASE FAIRLY 
STATED 109–10 (2d ed. 1820). 
 7. ROBINS, supra note 2, at 22–25. 
 8. HARRAL, supra note 6, at 112. 
 9. Id. at 112–13. The charges included allegations that the Princess gave birth to a child as a 
result of an adulterous affair. Id. at 114. 
 10. SMITH, supra note 1, at 426. 
 11. Id.  
 12. HARRAL, supra note 6, at 136. Largely public sentiment favored Caroline because her letters 
to the Prince of Wales, after being returned unopened, were published in the national newspapers. 
ROBINS, supra note 2, at 41. 
 13. ROBINS, supra note 2, at 42. 
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From this point on, the strained relations between Princess and Prince 
became a “party question” and begat the utilization of public commissions 
and references of private matters between the couple to the mediation or 
determination by commissions or Parliament.14 These public machinations 
“long gratified the malice of faction, fed the vulgar appetite for slander, 
and disturbed the repose of the country.”15 The fraction between the future 
King and Queen of England aroused newspapers to declare themselves 
either for or against either personage; a steady stream of addresses from 
public bodies supporting Caroline appeared all over the country, as did 
Caroline’s politically charged responses written by opposition 
politicians.16  
The climax of tensions between the Princess and Prince occurred upon 
the proposition of marriage between Caroline and George’s daughter 
Princess Charlotte to the Prince of Orange. Princess Charlotte refused the 
match arranged by her father on reliance of her mother’s advice.17 This 
caused her father, Prince George, considerable anger and resulted in a 
short-lived quarrel between father and daughter.18 As a result of the intra-
family conflict, Parliament publicly debated, for a brief time, the Prince’s 
treatment of his daughter and the estrangement caused by the Prince’s 
actions.19 Reconciliation being effected between father and daughter, 
Princess Caroline sought and received leave from her husband and his 
ministers to leave England.20 What followed was the effective banishment 
of the Queen, at the time the Princess of Wales, from England. As she 
sojourned throughout Europe she was treated as neither nobility nor 
royalty. Her absence “surprised, astonished, and chagrined beyond 
description” the opposition party in England.21 
George, after years of politically aligning with the opposition party, the 
Whigs, abandoned them upon his ascension to the British throne in favor 
of retaining the former Tory administration of his father, which caused the 
Whigs to harbor venomous ill-will against the new King for his failure to 
establish them in power.22 Despite this regal affront, the Whigs were 
 
 
 14. HARRAL, supra note 6, at 136–37. 
 15. Id. at 143. 
 16. ROBINS, supra note 2, at 43–44. 
 17. HARRAL, supra note 6, at 153. 
 18. Id. at 154. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 155. 
 21. Id. 
 22. ROBINS, supra note 2, at 35; Philip Harling, Parliament, the State, and “Old Corruption”: 
Conceptualizing Reform, c. 1790–1832, in RETHINKING THE AGE OF REFORM: BRITAIN 1780–1850 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/2
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gaining popularity and seeking to overthrow the established Tory 
government. Largely, this was due to the Tory reaction following the 
Peterloo massacre in 1819 where approximately 60,000 citizens gathered 
for a mass meeting and were dispersed by government troops after eleven 
citizens were killed and four hundred injured.23 The radical press 
feverously published anti-government tracts decrying gross violations of 
traditional English constitutional rights.24 The Tories perceived that the 
“threat of unrest leading to active insurrection seemed to reach its peak” 
with the Peterloo massacre.25  
The Tory administration responded to this revolutionary tumult by 
recalling Parliament to reconstitute itself to pass the “Six Acts” or six laws 
for the seizure of arms, the suppression of secret military training, the 
punishment of blasphemous and seditious libels, and an increase of the 
stamp duty on newspapers.26 The laws imposed oppressive restraints on 
the British public’s freedoms.27 The acts, “implicitly testifying to the 
challenge Parliament perceived to be presented by the sheer scale of 
popular political engagement at the time, . . . accepted and endorsed some 
aspects of the changing political culture they strove to contain.”28 Largely, 
the Six Acts were targeted to suppress radical calls for parliamentary 
reform, prevent mass meetings by radicals, and stifle the perceived 
overturn of English society occurring through newspapers and pamphlets 
that sought to undermine religion, morals, and the law.29  
A few months after the passage of these acts, a conspiracy to murder 
the King’s ministers was thwarted and outward calls for revolution failed 
to raise substantial public support.30 Nevertheless, talk of revolution was 
widespread in 1819 and 1820 throughout England, and Caroline became 
 
 
104 (Arthur Burns & Joanna Innes eds., 2003) (noting that the Whigs failed to garner regal favor and 
were excluded from benefits of King’s political influence). 
 23. ROSE A. MELIKAN, JOHN SCOTT, LORD ELDON 1751–1838: THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 263–64 
(1999). 
 24. Id. at 265; STEVE POOLE, THE POLITICS OF REGICIDE IN ENGLAND, 1760–
1850: TROUBLESOME SUBJECTS 154 (2000). 
 25. MELIKAN, supra note 23, at 263. 
 26. Six Acts, 60 Geo. III, c. 1–2, 4, 6, 8–9 (1819) (Eng.); 1 SIR JOSEPH ARNOULD, MEMOIR OF 
THAMES, FIRST LORD FORMERLY LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND 128 (1873); see generally David 
Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel into First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 154, 161–64 (2001) (explaining English law of seditious libel). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Joanna Innes, Legislation and Public Participation 1760–1830, in THE BRITISH AND THEIR 
LAWS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 114 (David Lemmings ed., 2005). 
 29. MELIKAN, supra note 23, at 268–69; Harling, supra note 22, at 106. 
 30. ROBINS, supra note 2, at 104–05; POOLE, supra note 24, at 155. 
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the focus of popular opposition to the King and Tory government.31 The 
newspapers in London became “vehicles for propaganda on either side.”32 
2. The Green Bag and Beginning of the Trial 
Upon the death of King George III and ascension of Prince George to 
the regality of the United Kingdom, the exiled Caroline sought to assert 
her rights as Queen Consort of the Realm.33 The prospect of reunion with 
his bride proved extremely unpalatable to the new King George IV.34 As a 
result, the King, through his ministers, sought to purchase the Queen’s 
continued residence abroad.35 This offer of payment was coarsely refused 
by the affronted Queen.36 
As a result, the Queen returned to English soil and the King sent 
communications to both houses of Parliament to begin an investigation by 
secret committees into the sexual chastity of the Queen during her long 
voyage throughout Europe.37 The King transmitted to Parliament 
documents contained in a green bag assembled by his agents through an 
agency called the Milan Commission to impugn the chastity of the 
Queen.38 The House of Lords considered the King’s message and 
appointed a Secret Committee to investigate the contents of the green 
bag.39 The Secret Committee was to act like a grand jury to determine 
whether charges should be levied against the Queen.40  
 
 
 31. STEPHEN WADDAMS, LAW, POLITICS, AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: THE CAREER OF 
STEPHEN LUSHINGTON, 1782–1873 149 (1992). The Whigs entertained the idea of lobbying the King 
to place them into power upon the condition they secure the King a divorce from the Queen. 
ARNOULD, supra note 17, at 138–39. 
 32. MELIKAN, supra note 23, at 276. 
 33. BROWNE, supra note 2, at 371, 380–81. 
 34. ROBINS, supra note 2, at 95, 100.  
 35. BROWNE, supra note 2, at 380 (offering the sum of 50,000 pounds per year); HARRAL, supra 
note 6, at 164. 
 36. BROWNE, supra note 2, at 381 (asserting the Queen expressed utmost indignation and 
quoting the Queen as indicating that London was the only place for entertaining such proposals); 
accord HARRAL, supra note 6, at 164.  
 37. BROWNE, supra note 2, at 382; E.A. SMITH, A QUEEN ON TRIAL: THE AFFAIR OF QUEEN 
CAROLINE 44 (1993) (reproducing Lady Charlotte’s June 18, 1820, letter to Miss Berry). 
 38. Id.; HARRAL, supra note 6, at 166 (noting the Queen’s arrival occurred on same day the King 
went to Parliament to give royal assent to certain bills for first time that year). 
 39. FLORA FRASER, THE UNRULY QUEEN: THE LIFE OF QUEEN CAROLINE 381 (1996). 
 40. Id. It was determined impeachment (with trial in the House of Commons) was inappropriate 
because the acts complained of occurred outside of England and the alleged adultery took place 
between the Queen and a foreigner—thus high treason could not have been factually committed 
pursuant to law. Id. at 379; HARRAL, supra note 6, at 231 (indicating immediately before beginning 
trial all chief legal personages in England agreed high treason was not legally available).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/2
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The House of Commons refused to establish a similar secret committee 
as a result of the exquisite speeches delivered by the Queen’s Attorney 
General, Henry Brougham, and Solicitor General, Thomas Denman. 
Hence, the Lords proceeded through parliamentary procedure to consider a 
Bill for Pains and Penalties levied against the Queen alleging her infidelity 
to the King with an Italian servant.41 Such a remedy had not been 
introduced since the reign of Henry VIII, and proved extremely unpopular 
with the English populace.42 The Tory government made a deliberate 
choice to proceed by a Bill of Pains and Penalties because: recrimination 
evidence or testimony about the King’s own infidelity “was technically 
irrelevant;” the government could deny the Queen a list of witnesses 
against her; and the government was not required to prove “each wrongful 
act by two witnesses.”43 The latter two procedural benefits to the 
government arose as a result of the “alleged adultery occur[ring] abroad 
and with a man owing no allegiance to the laws of Great Britain,” which 
legally prevented the Queen from being charged with treason—and 
receiving greater procedural protections.44  
The Secret Committee of the Lords referred back to the full House a 
report which spawned a bill to “deprive her Majesty Caroline Amelia 
Elizabeth of the Title, Prerogatives, Rights, Privileges, and Pretensions of 
Queen Consort of this Realm, and to dissolve the marriage between his 
Majesty and the Queen.”45 With the bill laid before the upper house of 
Parliament, the Queen insisted on a public trial, which occurred in the 
House of Lords for several weeks from August through October 1820.46 
 
 
 41. FRASER, supra note 39, at 400. 
 42. Id. at 375–412 (describing committee actions and public sentiment as expressed through 
riots, mobs, and the press). In essence, the Queen was to be tried for adultery in the House of Lords by 
those who were beholden to the King for their rank and privileges—and some of whom conducted the 
“delicate investigation”. See id. 
 43. MELIKAN, supra note 23, at 280–81. 
 44. Id. 
 45. BROWNE, supra note 2, at 462–64 (reproducing the bill). 
 46. HARRAL, supra note 6, at 169, 184 (relating that the Queen’s counsel read a message in the 
House of Commons as secret committees debated asking for public hearings on accusations). The 
Queen rejected an offer by Parliament to mediate the matter. ARNOULD, supra note 17, at 155–56 
(describing in Denman’s own words the dejected sentiments of the members of Parliament who 
proposed mediation, the public enthusiasm for the Queen’s rejection of the proposal, and the 
determination of the failed mediators to retaliate against the Queen); 2 SPENCER WALPOLE, A 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE GREAT WAR IN 1815 40–43 (1878) (describing 
an attempted negotiation and indicating that failure of negotiation left the government no other choice 
but to prosecute the Queen). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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3. Trial in the Lords 
From the perspectives of the King and the radical reformers, the trial of 
Queen Caroline may be seen as the use of legal procedures by both 
political factions to accomplish divergent ends.47 The King desired 
extinguishment of a radical heroine and the radicals desired the visage of 
the Queen to brand their new form of government on the English 
countryside. The prosecution lasted from August 17 to September 8 and its 
occurrences were broadcast to the nation through daily newspaper 
accounts—“the public excitement was unparalleled, and little was heard 
throughout England but the story of the Queen and her wrongs.”48 The 
defense of the Queen took place over thirty-four days, from October 3 to 
November 10, with an open debate on the bill in the House of Lords 
following the conclusion of the trial.49 Public sentiment was strongly on 
the side of the Queen throughout the proceedings.50 
Before the trial began various Lords moved to, in essence, quash the 
bill on the basis that the procedures established were too vague or the 
House’s consideration of the bill was not in the interests of the nation.51 
Each of these motions to immediately cease consideration of the bill failed 
to gain a majority of support to carry the motions and table the bill.52 The 
Lords sanctioned, in conformance with established lawful procedures, 
denial of a list of witnesses scheduled to testify against the Queen over the 
strong objections of some Lords.53 
The case against the Queen consisted primarily of Italian citizens 
whom she had employed in various conditions to attend her on her sojourn 
throughout Europe.54 The Queen herself attended the proceedings 
infrequently while her lawyers argued her case. The rationale for 
undertaking the trial was, as the prosecution stated at the conclusion of 
 
 
 47. It should be noted that the Queen and King’s counselors met briefly to negotiate a settlement 
between the parties, which came to nothing. HARRAL, supra note 6, at 176–79 (describing in an 
unnumbered footnote documents presented before the House of Lords relating to the negotiation); 
BROWNE, supra note 2, at 392 (describing some Lords as irritated at the Queen’s refusal to mediate 
given a large majority in House of Commons desiring this route); ARNOULD, supra note 17, at 153–54 
(describing the meeting and its futility). 
 48. SMITH, supra note 1, at 427. See FRASER, supra note 39, at 413–44 (describing the trial and 
public sentiment strongly against the King). 
 49. HARRAL, supra note 6, at 245. 
 50. LORD FRANK PAKENHAM LONGFORD, A HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS 102–06 (1999). 
 51. HARRAL, supra note 6, at 246–47. 
 52. Id.; ROBINS, supra note 2, at 171. 
 53. 2 PARL. DEB., H.L. (2d Series) (1820) 440–45; HARRAL, supra note 6, at 200–08. 
 54. ROBINS, supra note 2, at 187 (noting the English cultural distrust of foreigners, especially 
Italians). 
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their case, the support of the morals and sustenance of the reputation of the 
country.55 The defense asserted the proceedings were instituted with talk 
“of the honor and safety of the country, yet its dearest interests, its peace, 
its morals, and its happiness are to be sacrificed to satisfy [the King’s] 
desires.”56  
The first prosecution witness, Theodore Majocchi, caused the greatest 
sensation because of his flawless recitation of incriminations against the 
Queen on direct examination and his utter failure to recall anything other 
then his rehearsed testimony on cross examination.57 The result was a deep 
blow to the prosecution whose moniker became “non mi ricordo,” which 
after some dispute by the learned Lords was translated “I do not 
remember.”58 
These events caused a public frenzy as gazetteers and pamphleteers 
derided the government’s case.59 The press heretofore actively restrained 
by the seditious libel laws enjoyed a new freedom of expression.60 The 
agitation became frenzied, fueled by the popular dislike of the King and 
the perceived sham of a proceeding unfolding in London against the 
Queen—many Lords thought it politically dangerous to pass the bill and 
send it for further debate in the House of Commons.61  
The radicals seized upon the forensic skill of the Queen’s chief 
counselor, Henry Brougham, in utterly discrediting the government’s chief 
witness by daily processing formal written addresses from towns and cities 
across England proclaiming their support for the Queen’s cause.62 Indeed, 
Brougham became “worshipped by the reformers, who looked upon him 
as the boldest and most potent sustainer of their cause; while the Tories 
regarded him as the willing subverter of the constitution and the arch 
betrayer of his country.”63  
Against the backdrop of this charged atmosphere, the Lords adjourned 
on September 9 for three weeks to resume the tribunal on October 3 and 
 
 
 55. HARRAL, supra note 6, at 253. 
 56. BROWNE, supra note 2, at 390 (reproducing Henry Brougham’s speech on August 17, 1820, 
to the Lords arguing against an initial hearing of the bill).  
 57. ROBINS, supra note 2, at 192–99. 
 58. WALPOLE, supra note 46, at 51 vol. 2; BROWNE, supra note 2, at 401 n.7 (recounting two 
interpretations offered by prosecution and defense experts). 
 59. ROBINS, supra note 2, at 199.  
 60. Id. at 235–46; FRASER, supra note 39, at 413–44. 
 61. WADDAMS, supra note 31, at 145. 
 62. WALPOLE, supra note 46, vol. 2, at 45 (noting that petitions asking that the Bill be withdrawn 
were also presented to Parliament from the city of London). 
 63. BENJAMIN COULSON ROBINSON, BENCH AND BAR: REMINISCENCES OF ONE OF THE LAST OF 
AN ANCIENT RACE 219 (1889). 
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receive any defense witnesses.64 During this long period of repose, the 
“case against the Queen was permitted to circulate throughout the world 
and sink deep in every mind . . . without contradiction or comment . . . ; 
the result was an impression which no negative testimony could have the 
least chance of removing.”65 Hence, the trial became a contest where the 
government fought for its continued existence and the opposition “gladly 
took up a cause in which they knew they were supported by the bulk of the 
people of all classes, not so much from a firm belief in the queen’s 
innocence as in disgust at the conduct of the King, her real prosecutor.”66  
The commencement of the Queen’s defense began with the moving 
oration of Henry Brougham imploring the Lords to “save the Crown, 
which is in jeopardy, the Aristocracy, which is shaken; [and] . . . the Altar, 
which must stagger from the shock that rends its kindred throne.”67 His 
statement reveals the extent to which these machinations shook the 
foundation of English civilization. The monarchy was in a precarious state 
of continued existence, the nobility in a position of losing their hereditary 
privileges, and the church (much like its predecessor in Henry VIII’s time) 
appeared to acquiesce in royal prerogatives to excise a regal wife.68  
The Queen’s defense began on sound footing but quickly fell into a 
precarious situation when Lieutenant John Flynn fainted under cross 
examination.69 The imputation was that he had manufactured his 
testimony to serve the Queen’s interests.70 Another Lieutenant, Howman, 
introduced damaging evidence about the Queen’s dubious chastity, which 
led to the conclusion that these two Lieutenants “did the queen more harm 
than all the testimony furnished by the other side.”71 Brougham began to 
threaten to introduce evidence of the King’s covert marriage to a Catholic 
before his marriage to the Queen.72 This was no pale threat; if proved, it 
would have caused the King to immediately forfeit his throne because an 
act of Parliament forbade any English King to marry a Catholic.73 
 
 
 64. HARRAL, supra note 6, at 245. 
 65. ARNOULD, supra note 17, at 170. 
 66. BROWNE, supra note 2, at 422. 
 67. ARNOULD, supra note 17, at 169 n.1 (reproducing Brougham’s speech). 
 68. Cf. Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1213, 1216 (2006) (recounting that the military supported the Queen and threatened mutiny 
against the King and government). 
 69. ROBINS, supra note 2, at 250; WALPOLE, supra note 47, at 593. 
 70. ROBINS, supra note 2, at 261. 
 71. WALPOLE, supra note 46, vol. 2, at 54. 
 72. ROBINS, supra note 2, at 263. 
 73. Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3 (Eng.) (excluding any Roman Catholic 
from ever ascending to the throne of England); Royal Marriages Act, 1772, 12 Geo. 3, c. 11 (Eng.) 
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The King’s hope to hurriedly dismiss the Queen by public 
condemnation of her behavior abroad—and thus quell the radical 
ambitions—proved futile. Instead, the same elements he sought to put 
down rose in rebellious uproar against the foundations of English 
constitutional monarchy. These radicals paraded in enormous numbers to 
the Queen’s temporary residence in London to deliver written declarations 
of their allegiance to her cause and openly denounce the King and his 
government.74 
A decisive blow against the prosecution was levied by the defense 
witness Giuseppe Giaroline, who insinuated that the prosecution had 
bribed him to alter his testimony.75 The testimony supported the inference 
that the Milan Commission, whose charge was to investigate the Queen 
while she traveled throughout Europe, engaged in widespread tampering 
with witnesses to assure favorable testimony against the Queen.76 “That as 
to the bulk of the charges, the queen was the victim of an extended and 
well-paid conspiracy no one can doubt . . . .”77 
The trial closed among turbulent mobs in the streets of London 
cheering the Queen, newspapers adhering vehemently to either the 
government’s or Queen’s cause in an effort to influence the vote on the 
bill, and the lawyers inside the House of Lords making bombastic, 
politically charged speeches. In short, England was on the brink. On the 
one hand, revolution in the style of the Americans and the French might 
occur; on the other hand, the English people might preserve the status quo 
and adhere to traditional English governmental norms. 
The Lords retired to consider the bill at the beginning of November and 
debated its merits for four days.78 On the second reading of the bill, a 
majority of the House were in favor of passing the bill.79 Yet, many of the 
Lords “who firmly believed in [the Queen’s] guilt thought the measure 
inexpedient, and therefore voted against it.”80 Some in the government 
itself were “becoming increasingly lukewarm about the whole business . . . 
and wanted the bill quietly put out of the way in the Lords without ever 
 
 
(denying legal recognition of any marriage by one of royal blood unless expressly approved by the 
monarch). 
 74. ROBINS, supra note 2, at 264. 
 75. Id. at 265–66. 
 76. Id. 
 77. BROWNE, supra note 2, at 420. 
 78. WALPOLE, supra note 46, at 56. 
 79. Id. (noting vote 123 for and 95 against). 
 80. Id. 
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coming to the Commons.”81 The King’s desire for divorce ultimately 
turned against him because the opposition insisted the bill retain the 
divorce clause to make the bill more objectionable.82 The government, 
“worn out by the interminable meetings of the Lords . . . agreed in cabinet 
that if the majority on the third reading of the bill dropped to something 
like ten or twelve,” the Tory Leader and Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, 
would withdraw the measure.83 The third reading of the bill won a nine 
vote majority; Liverpool immediately rose and withdrew the bill.84 In the 
end, a “vast majority of the Lords were undoubtedly clear that the queen 
was guilty, though only a small majority were willing to assent to the 
propriety of the proceedings against her.”85 
Thus concluded the legal proceedings in the English House of Lords 
described as the trial of Queen Caroline. The next section of this article 
details the proceedings against William Jefferson Clinton, forty-second 
president of the United States. In a later section the aftermath or reactions 
to the trial of Queen Caroline are discussed in detail. Having described the 
historical event of the trial, analysis of reaction to the trial occurs after 
consideration of the Clinton impeachment proceedings to allow for a clear 
comparison. 
B. William Jefferson Clinton, Forty-Second President of the United States 
As with the description of Queen Caroline’s trial, the following 
account restricts itself to only the essential events necessary to evaluate 
whether the legal procedures employed were used as political weapons, as 
others have more copiously recounted the historical event of the 
impeachment of President Clinton.86 Like the extraordinary Bill of Pains 
and Penalties levied against Queen Caroline, the impeachment 
 
 
 81. NORMAN GASH, LORD LIVERPOOL: THE LIFE AND POLITICAL CAREER OF ROBERT BANKS 
JENKINSON SECOND EARL OF LIVERPOOL 1770–1828 164 (1984). 
 82. Id. at 165. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. WALPOLE, supra note 46, at 56; Accord HARRAL, supra note 6, at 290–91 (reproducing 
dissents by Lords to withdraw the bill which stated verbatim that many Lords believed the Queen was 
guilty and yet voted against the bill). 
 86. See, e.g., PETER BAKER, THE BREACH: INSIDE THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF WILLIAM 
JEFFERSON CLINTON (2000); RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, 
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (1999); DAVID P. SCHIPPERS WITH ALAN P. 
HENRY, SELLOUT: THE INSIDE STORY OF PRESIDENT CLINTON’S IMPEACHMENT (2000); JEFFREY 
TOOBIN, A VAST CONSPIRACY: THE REAL STORY OF THE SEX SCANDAL THAT NEARLY BROUGHT 
DOWN A PRESIDENT (1999).  
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proceedings initiated against President Clinton were only the second such 
occurrence in United States history.87 
Sexual infidelity was the cornerstone of the impeachment proceedings 
against President Clinton.88 Unlike the case against Queen Caroline, 
President Clinton’s wrongdoing actually involved his alleged obstruction 
of justice and perjury in judicial proceedings.89 But sexual indiscretions 
were the subject matter that formed the basis of the President’s 
impeachable offenses because he lied about having sexual liaisons with a 
female then-White House staffer.90  
1. Prelude 
The context in which these proceedings took place was the 1992 
capture of the majority of seats in the House of Representatives and Senate 
by the opposition party (the Republicans).91 This “Republican Revolution” 
was fueled by Representative Newt Gingrich’s reform proposal called the 
“Contract with America,” (Contract) which set out a number of 
governmental reforms.92 The Contract reforms were implemented with 
staggering speed once the Republicans assumed power. The success of 
these legislative reforms prompted strong public support for the 
Republican Party. To the dismay of the Republicans, Republican 
challenger Robert Dole did not win the ensuing presidential election in 
1996.93 Instead, the American people re-elected President Clinton. 
 
 
 87. PETER B. LEVEY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY 194 (2002) (noting that 
Andrew Johnson in 1868 was the only other American president formally impeached). President 
Richard Nixon was not formally impeached because the House of Representatives did not vote on 
Articles of Impeachment transmitted by the House Judiciary Committee. See POSNER, supra note 86, 
at 171. 
 88. David T. Canon & Kenneth R. Mayer, Everything You Thought About Impeachment is 
Wrong, in AFTERMATH: THE CLINTON IMPEACHMENT AND THE PRESIDENCY IN THE AGE OF 
SPECTACLE 47 (Leonard V. Kaplan & Beverly I. Moran eds., 2001); James Burk, The Fate of The 
Republic, SOCIETY, Mar. 1999, at 40. 
 89. 105 CONG. REC. H11, 774 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1998). 
 90. H.R. REP. NO. 105-830, at 33–35 (1998) (explaining the basis for articles of impeachment); 
George M. Pomer, Coarse Acts and Common Sense, SOCIETY, MAR. 1999, at 22. 
 91. JOHN J. JANSSEN, CONSTITUTIONAL EQUILIBRIA: THE PARTISAN CONTINGENCY OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FROM THE JEFFERSONIAN “REVOLUTION” TO THE IMPEACHMENT 
OF BILL CLINTON 145 (2000). 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 147. 
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2. The Independent Counsel 
Many of the chief Republican lawmakers harbored a vitriolic dislike of 
President Clinton.94 The President had weathered countless scandals 
during his first term and a number of political failures.95 An independent 
counsel had been investigating President Clinton’s dubious conduct since 
1994 but had failed to uncover substantial evidence to prosecute.96 
Legislative deadlock ensued, with a number of actual shutdowns of the 
federal government—actions which, in retrospect, may have caused the 
Republicans to lose popular support in the 1996 presidential election.97  
The case against President Clinton began with the revelation of tape 
recorded conversations between Linda Tripp and Monica Lewinsky, a 
former White House intern. In January 1998 Kenneth Starr, Independent 
Counsel and a former federal judge, obtained the tapes.98 As a result of 
these conversations and the President’s subsequent testimony before a 
federal grand jury, the Independent Counsel issued the “Starr Report” 
urging the House of Representatives to conduct an impeachment inquiry 
into discrete areas of presidential misconduct involving sworn testimony 
given in recent judicial proceedings and recommending several possible 
grounds for impeachment.99  
The Starr Report was apathetically received by the American public as 
evidenced by opinion polling at the time.100 The tactics utilized by the 
Independent Counsel were widely condemned, and included:  
interrogating Monica Lewinsky for eleven hours while discouraging 
her from calling her lawyer, putting pressure on her by threatening 
to prosecute her mother for unrelated offenses, urging her to wear a 
wire to trap Clinton and [close friend and advisor Vernon] Jordan in 
a sting operation, threatening witnesses with imprisonment and 
 
 
 94. MICHAEL WALDMAN, POTUS SPEAKS: FINDING THE WORDS THAT DEFINED THE CLINTON 
PRESIDENCY 245 (2000) (noting Republican congressional leader Tom Delay’s hatred of Clinton). 
 95. The widely publicized scandals were named Filegate, Travelgate, Monicagate, Whitewater, 
Chinagate, and Koreagate. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Historical and Constitutional Significance of the 
Impeachment and Trial of President Clinton, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 363 (1999). 
 96. LEVEY, supra note 87, at 196. 
 97. JANSSEN, supra note 91, at 146. 
 98. LEVEY, supra note 87, at 196. 
 99. OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, A REFERRAL TO THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES FILED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE 28, UNITED STATES 
CODE, SECTION 595(C), H.R. DOC. NO. 105-310 (2d Sess. 1998) (grounds section). On the role and 
function of the Independent Counsel relating to impeachment proceedings see Julie R. O’Sullivan, The 
Interaction Between Impeachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193 (1998). 
 100. ROBERT BUSBY, DEFENDING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: CLINTON AND THE LEWINSKY 
SCANDAL 205 (2001). 
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financial ruin for very minor transgressions if they failed to come 
across with cooperative testimony, sending investigators to pore 
over the sexual habits and reading habits of potential witnesses and 
targets, [and] leaking damaging information about targets to the 
press.101 
Many Americans believed the Independent Counsel, frustrated at his 
inability to obtain evidence of the President’s wrongdoing, desired any 
means to attack a man he believed to be evil.102 Further, most Americans 
from the outset of the proceedings believed the impeachment of President 
Clinton to be politically motivated.103 Many thought the Independent 
Counsel was a “zealous partisan out to get President Clinton” who 
produced an “exceedingly partisan as well as intellectually and 
analytically dishonest” report.104 This view may have resulted from the 
fact that Congress publicly released the Starr Report before beginning an 
impeachment inquiry.105 
Nonetheless, as a result of the Independent Counsel’s report, the House 
conducted a formal debate on whether to authorize the House Judiciary 
Committee to inquire into whether the Report and its attendant evidence 
established grounds for impeachment of the President.106 As a result of the 
Republican legislative majority, the House of Representatives voted to 
authorize its Judiciary Committee to investigate whether impeachable 
offenses had been committed by the President.107 The ensuing hearings 
 
 
 101. Robert W. Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship: Starr’s OIC and the Clinton-Lewinsky 
Affair, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 690 (1999); see, e.g., David Nyhan, A Right-wing Conspiracy? You Be 
the Judge, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17, 1999, at A15 (detailing feelings about Starr’s bias toward 
Clinton’s guilt). 
 102. Gordon, supra note 101, at 703; Wilson Carey McWilliams, Who Got Impeached?, 126 
COMMONWEAL 12, 13 (1999). 
 103. Ronald Brownstein, National Perspective; With Impeachment Book Closed, Here’s What 
We’ve Learned So Far, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at A5. Interestingly, a poll taken after the 
impeachment trial in the Senate illustrated more Americans found the President to blame for the 
proceedings against him than the Republicans. Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, Public Blames 
Clinton, Gives Record Support, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1999, at A1. Henry Hyde, Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee, stated, “We understood our position was not a popular one. It was a 
principled one.” Id.; Tom Squitieri, Grim but Proud, Prosecutors Head Home Managers Feel that 
Senators Sabotaged Case, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 15, 1999, at 11A. 
 104. Michael deHaven Newsom, Independent Counsel? No. Ombudsman? Yes: A Parable of 
American Ideology and Myth, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 141, 178 (2000). 
 105. H.R. REP. NO. 105-830, at 124–25 (1998). 
 106. S. DOC. NO. 106-3, at 3 (1999) (referring to Rep. Henry Hyde’s opening statement 
concerning establishing an impeachment inquiry authorization). See John Arthos, Appeal to 
Proportion in the Clinton Impeachment Trial: Reconciling Judgment with Disposition, 66 WEST. J. 
COMM. 208, 212 (2002) (describing public and congressional representatives’ perception that 
Independent Counsel was biased and proceedings were zealously partisan).  
 107. 105 CONG. REC. H10, 118 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998). The debate on authorizing the Judiciary 
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before the Judiciary Committee were intensely partisan.108 After 
determining a method to institute an impeachment inquiry, the House 
heard from staff counsel on their interpretations of the evidence submitted 
by the Independent Counsel, then from a panel of legal experts on what 
the standards of impeachment consisted of, and finally from witnesses for 
both sides.109 Articles of Impeachment against the President were sent to 
the full House for consideration by the Republican majority on the 
Judiciary Committee on a straight party-line vote.110  
3. Impeachment in The House 
The entire House of Representatives considered the Articles of 
Impeachment transmitted by the Judiciary Committee.111 The Committee 
transmitted four Articles of Impeachment to the full House, but only two 
Articles were approved.112 The first Article impeached the President 
because he had “willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial process 
of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration . . . [by] 
willfully provid[ing] perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the 
[federal] grand jury.”113 The second Article impeached President Clinton 
because he violated his constitutional duty 
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, . . . prevented, 
obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice, and . . . 
engaged personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in a 
course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, 
 
 
Committee was limited to two hours for each party—about one day to decide whether to conduct an 
impeachment inquiry. 105 CONG. REC. H10, 015 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998). 
 108. Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian 
Device, 49 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (1999); Susan Low Bloch, A Report Card on the Impeachment: Judging the 
Institutions That Judged President Clinton, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 149 (2000) (asserting 
that after the Starr Report was received by the Judiciary Committee, impeachment was a forgone 
conclusion and all subsequent proceedings were partisan). 
 109. H.R. REP. NO. 105-830, at 127 (1998). 
 110. Id. at 129–35 (votes in favor of impeachment clauses were all twenty-one Republicans in 
favor and all sixteen Democrats against); Frank O. Bowman, III, Falling Out of Love With America: 
The Clinton Impeachment and the Madisonian Constitution, 60 MD. L. REV. 5, 10 (2001) (noting that 
Chairman Hyde abandoned consensus building and pushed impeachment articles out of Committee 
through his majority).  
 111. 105 CONG. REC. H11, supra note 90, at 774. 
 112. H.R. REP. NO. 105-830, at 128 (1998) (indicating referral of four articles out of the Judicial 
Committee); 105 CONG. REC. H12, 40-42 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998) (Articles I and III passed and 
Articles II and IV rejected). 
 113. S. DOC. NO. 106-4, at 18 (1999). 
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and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related to a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him.114  
The President was impeached by the majority party, the Republicans, 
in opposition to preferences of a large majority of Americans.115 The 
results of the congressional election occurring immediately before the 
House of Representatives voted to impeach the President illustrate that the 
American public did not support impeachment of the President.116 The 
Republicans lost a number of congressional seats, but retained a modest 
majority in both houses of Congress.117 The “lame-duck” House of 
Representatives that impeached the President in December 1998 contained 
a greater majority of Republicans than were elected/reelected in the 
November congressional election in 1998.118 With the prediction of a 
substantial gain in congressional seats by Republican leader and Speaker 
of the House Newt Gingrich unfulfilled, Gingrich resigned as Speaker of 
the House three days after the November election.119 With the electoral 
loss, many believed Republicans would table impeachment.120 This view 
was magnified when Republican Robert Livingston, Speaker of the 
House-elect, also resigned amidst allegations of his own sexual 
misconduct.121 Despite electoral losses in the 1998 midterm congressional 
elections and damaging public resignations by party members, the House 
impeached the President.122 The Democrats viewed the impeachment as 
engineered by their Republican opponents, and the American people saw 
the impeachment broadcast to them as a “partisan ganging-up.”123 
 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. IRWIN L. MORRIS, VOTES, MONEY, AND THE CLINTON IMPEACHMENT 8 (2001) (declaring 
that Republicans voted to impeach on their own and in opposition to preferences of large majority of 
Americans); BUSBY, supra note 100, at 188, 206 (arguing Republicans sought to remove President 
Clinton against popular will and inconformity with partisan motives); Turley, supra note 108, at 98 
(asserting the vote to impeach was largely partisan and noting that some Democrats defected to vote 
for the impeachment articles and some Republicans voted against the articles).  
 116. LEVEY, supra note 87, at 197. 
 117. Id. 
 118. POSNER, supra note 86, at 181–82. 
 119. CANON & MAYER, supra note 88, at 50. Gingrich asserted on election day the Republicans 
would gain 20 seats in the House. Id. 
 120. Id.; MORRIS, supra note 115, at 5, 7 (noting Washington insiders surprised that Republicans 
continued process despite Democrats gaining electoral victories). 
 121. LEVEY, supra note 87, at 197. 
 122. See Pomper, supra note 90, at 24. 
 123. Adrienne F. Brovero, Dale Bumper’s Ad Hominem Impeachment Trial of President Clinton, 
36 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 218 (2000). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1 Erskine article book pages.doc 12/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
18 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:1 
 
 
 
 
4. Similarities between Caroline & Clinton  
The trial of President Clinton began with the appointment of Managers 
by the House to conduct the prosecution of the President in the Senate.124 
Interestingly, House Manager Representative Henry Hyde (also chairman 
of the House Judiciary Committee) referred to Thomas More’s refusal to 
swear a false oath in his opening statement in the Senate to begin the trial 
of the President.125 In response to Hyde’s quotation to English authority 
the President’s counsel could have referred the Senate to an equally 
convincing English precedent—that of the trial of Queen Caroline. The 
reference is particularly fitting because of the parallel between the green 
bag presented to Parliament containing evidence against the Queen and the 
Independent Counsel’s similar submission of boxes of evidence to the 
House.126 Both proceedings were, in essence, initiated by a third party—
the King and the Independent Counsel—who provided all the evidence 
accusing the individual of misconduct outside of the legislative domain.127 
Like Queen Caroline, President Clinton denied any illicit sexual affair 
occurred with Monica Lewinsky.128 Unlike Caroline, Clinton’s public 
assertion that no sexual affair took place was retracted after DNA testing 
revealed the presence of the President’s genetic material on Lewinsky’s 
dress.129 The judges of each individual believed sexual contact occurred, 
but only in the case of President Clinton were such sexual relations 
actually shown.130 Keeping these proceedings in mind, the last similarity 
between these two national events is found in the results of their respective 
trials. 
5. Trial in the Senate 
The impeachment trial proceeded with presentation of the House’s case 
against the President and the President’s counselors presenting a 
defense.131 These presentations consisted of speeches made by the House 
Managers and counsel for the President in the Senate chamber, 
 
 
 124. S. DOC. NO. 106-4, at 19 (1999). 
 125. Id. at 1007. 
 126. See supra notes 38–39. 
 127. Id. 
 128. LEVEY, supra note 87, at 196. 
 129. NICOL C. RAE & COLTON CAMPBELL, IMPEACHING CLINTON: PARTISAN STRIFE ON CAPITAL 
HILL 3 (2004); Richard M. Pious, The Paradox of Clinton Winning and The Presidency Losing, 114 
POL. SCI. Q. 569, 589 (1999). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See supra note 124, at 1091. 
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summarizing the evidence related to the two Articles of Impeachment 
tendered by the House to the Senate.132 The Republican House Managers 
asserted the evidence received by the Independent Counsel supported the 
two allegations of impeachable offenses, while the President’s counsel 
refuted such claims.133 After the presentations, the Senators were 
permitted to pose written questions to the House Managers and counsel for 
the President.134 Unlike the Lords in Queen Caroline’s trial, the Senators 
were prevented from interfering or interacting with the Managers and 
counsel for the President during their evidentiary presentations.135 The 
written questions were presented to the presiding officer, the Chief Justice 
of the United States Supreme Court, to be read aloud.136 Only the party 
questioned was permitted to answer the question posed.137 A party could 
not respond to a question posed to the other party or offer rebuttal to the 
answer given by the opposing party.138 
At the conclusion of the question and answer period, Senator Byrd of 
West Virginia (a Democrat) brought a motion to dismiss the impeachment 
inquiry against the president.139 The House Managers and President’s 
counsel were permitted to argue the motion, while the Senators debated 
the motion in closed session.140 Before voting on the motion to dismiss, 
the Senate also considered a motion by the House Managers to permit 
presentation of additional evidence and order additional depositions to be 
taken from, among others, Monica Lewinsky and the President.141 After a 
closed session of the Senate, the Senators rejected the motion to dismiss 
and voted in favor of the motion to allow additional depositions (excluding 
the President) into evidence.142 
It should be noted that on January 27, 1997, a short time after the votes 
on the two motions described above,143 Senator Hollings stated 
[a] couple of weeks ago the Senate was about to go over the 
precipice of partisanship . . . Senator BYRD continued to calm 
partisan zeal and give us all a sense of historic perspective. We 
 
 
 132. Id. at 1091–1225, 1292–1335. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1337–38. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1338. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 1337. 
 139. Id. at 1469. 
 140. Id. at 1469–97. 
 141. Id. at 1531–32; see also id. at 1500–78. 
 142. Id. at 1582–83, 1613. 
 143. Id. at 1595. 
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started talking sense instead of politics. It got us together. We could 
have gone the way of the House, but Senator BYRD is the one who 
put us on the right path. (emphasis added)144 
The Senator’s statement illuminates the central fact that the participants 
in the impeachment trial felt at the time that the proceedings were 
politically motivated.145 Indeed, Senator Byrd’s speech delivered to the 
Senators collected in closed session may be the most revealing description 
of the impeachment trial:  
The White House has sullied itself. The House of Representatives 
has fallen into the black pit of partisan self-indulgence. The Senate 
is teetering on the brink of that same black pit. Meanwhile, the 
American people look in vain for the order and leadership promised 
to them by the Constitution. Of one thing I am sure: the public trust 
in all of the institutions of government has severely suffered.146 
Like Henry Brougham’s speech to the Lords declaring the destruction 
of English constitutionalism if a verdict was entered against the Queen, 
Senator Byrd captured the public mood when he asserted “[o]ur supreme 
duty is not to any particular person or party, but to the people of the 
Nation and to the future of this Republic.”147 Like Brougham, Byrd pulled 
the senators from a precipice—had the senators impeached the President, 
the damage to the American political system could have been great.148 
Unlike the English in 1820, the Americans were not on the verge of 
revolution. Yet, popular calls for substantial reform of the federal 
government, similar to those advocated at the time of the Seventeenth 
Amendment’s enactment, could have resulted.149 The quelling of partisan 
rhetoric in the Senate averted such a fate for the American republic, but 
 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Senator McCain’s published statement concerning his vote to impeach the president asserted, 
“I don’t lightly dismiss the public’s clear opposition to conviction.” Id. at 2565. See also BUSBY, supra 
note 100, at 206 (asserting public opinion played second fiddle to partisan disposition). 
 146. S. DOC. NO. 106-4, at 1596 (1999) (Senator’s speech printed only in Senate’s records and 
was not delivered directly to the America public on the Senate floor.). 
 147. Id. at 1598; ARNOULD, supra note 17. 
 148. S. DOC. NO. 106–4, at 1598 (1999). As one scholar stated, the impeachment processes was a 
“[p]eriod in U.S. history during which the engine of conventional politics—constituents and their 
interests—was forgotten.” MORRIS, supra note 115, at 12. 
 149. See generally Donald J. Kochan, State Laws and the Independent Judiciary: An Analysis of 
the Effects of the Seventeenth Amendment on the Number of Supreme Court Cases Holding State Laws 
Unconstitutional, 66 ALB. L.REV. 1023, 1027–32 (2003); Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special 
Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007 (1994). 
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 with U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
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the sensation of the impeachment trial did have palpable effects upon 
American political institutions, as will be discussed in later sections. 
The trial of the President in the Senate concluded with deposition 
testimony from the witnesses identified in the Managers’ motion described 
above and hearing closing arguments from the House Managers and 
counsel for the President. The Senate then retired to closed deliberations to 
consider the fate of the forty-second President of the United States.150 
After a few days of deliberations, the Senate acquitted the President of the 
two Articles of Impeachment.151  
C. The Reactions to the Trials 
1. Caroline’s Acquittal 
The Bill of Pains and Penalties withdrawn, the King requested that a 
financial settlement to secure the Queen’s departure from the country be 
provided by the Tory government, notwithstanding public support for the 
Queen, evidenced by jubilant celebration in the streets and countless 
congratulatory written declarations published throughout Britain.152 The 
Tory government, realizing the hazards in acquiescing to the King’s 
request, asked the King to wait until popular frenzy for the Queen 
quieted.153 Incensed by the government’s unwillingness to fulfill his 
request, the King recessed Parliament.154 It appeared that Caroline’s 
popularity and predicament was at the point of shattering the ruling party, 
while “the opposition were joyfully anticipating the collapse of the 
administration in the new year.”155  
The Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, secretly circulated an offer of 
50,000 pounds per year to Caroline, with no recognition of her as Queen 
or English royalty.156 The move was desperate with the fate of government 
 
 
 150. S. DOC. NO. 106-4, at 1800–1994 (1999). 
 151. Id. at 2024. As Senator Specter’s published statement in closed deliberation asserted,  
[f]rom the time the Senate reconvened on January 6, 1999, the public pressure to conclude the 
trial promptly was palpable. The improbability of a two-thirds vote for conviction was only 
one factor although the totality of the other factors contributed to that improbability. The 
adverse public reaction was reflected in consistent polling data and the feel on the streets in 
our various States.  
Id. at 2720. 
 152. GASH, supra note 81, at 166; WALPOLE, supra note 46, at 599–600. 
 153. GASH, supra note 81, at 166. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 167. 
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at stake.157 Conveniently, public opinion in favor of the Queen suddenly 
collapsed, which “seemed at the time as inexplicable as the sudden frenzy 
of enthusiasm on her behalf.”158 Her trial did much to extinguish 
revolutionary zeal.159 The proceedings “played an important role in 
stemming the violent tide of violent insurrectionary rhetoric among 
frustrated and disillusioned radicals.”160 A strong factor in the Queen’s fall 
from popular favor was her acceptance of Liverpool’s 50,000 pound 
settlement when Parliament reassembled.161 Her acceptance of the 
settlement caused the Queen to lose her status as “a symbol of resistance 
to oppression.”162 
The Whigs attempted to rekindle public sentiments, but failed to 
convince the populace or fellow members of Parliament that a new 
government was needed.163 The Whigs’ effort was further stymied by 
members of their party who believed that the “King’s folly had put the 
Tories in a difficult position . . . but few [W]higs believed that the outburst 
of feeling for the queen would be lasting, or that it would destroy the 
ministry.”164 As a result, the Whigs failed to gain a legislative majority 
through popular support by the electorate in 1820.165 Despite the Whig 
electoral loss and the tempering of radical vigor, the Tory government did 
manage to change attitudes and repeal a number of their repressive 
measures enacted before Caroline’s trial.166  
The Queen’s trial had other substantial effects. Due to the increase in 
the publication of parliamentary debates, the press became a more 
powerful political force than the King’s political patronage.167 Indeed, the 
press arose as the expression of the popular will, which replaced the 
monarch’s political patronage as the motivating factor in English politics 
in the years following Caroline’s trial.168 
With the death of Caroline, the cessation of public outcries for radical 
reforms, and the influx of wealth into England in the later half of the 
 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 169. 
 159. WADDAMS, supra note 31, at 151. 
 160. POOLE, supra note 24, at 157.  
 161. SIR LLEWELLYN WOODWARD, THE AGE OF REFORM 1815–1870 68 (Sir George Clark ed., 
Oxford University Press 1962) (1938). 
 162. Id. at 68. 
 163. GASH, supra note 81, at 168. 
 164. WOODWARD, supra note 161, at 69. 
 165. Harling, supra note 22, at 104. 
 166. WOODWARD, supra note 158, at 72. 
 167. Harling, supra note 22, at 107. 
 168. POOLE, supra note 24, at 157.  
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1820s, the “Whigs’ enthusiasm for parliamentary reform waned.”169 Yet, 
the desire for legislative reform amongst the Whigs was diminished but 
not dead. In 1830, the radical dreams of reform were realized as the Whigs 
ousted the Tory government and assumed control of parliament.170 Soon 
after taking power, the Whig majority enacted the Reform Act of 1832 
[hereinafter 1832 Act],171 which transformed the parliamentary electoral 
system, expanded suffrage, and reformed many perceived parliamentary 
abuses.172 “Prior to the Act’s passage in 1832, the right to vote in general 
elections in the United Kingdom was based largely on property 
qualifications and extended to only five percent of the adult 
population.”173 The 1832 Act precipitated a century of reform measures, 
which recognized “the emergence of representative and participatory 
democracy as the primary principle of constitutional and political theory in 
Britain.”174 The seizure of government by the nobility and landed gentry 
ended with the Reform Act—and the populace finally seized control of the 
government that railed against its Queen.175 
2. Clinton’s Acquittal 
During the remaining two years of President Clinton’s administration, 
enactment of new laws and approval of presidential appointments 
stagnated.176 Meanwhile, the President was sanctioned for contempt of 
court by the judge presiding over the civil suit against him.177 His license 
to practice law was suspended as he received public reprimand from the 
Arkansas state bar.178 Clinton’s last act as President created another 
 
 
 169. Harling, supra note 22, at 111. 
 170. Id. at 110–13. 
 171. Reform Act of 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 65, §§ I, IV (Eng.) [hereinafter 1832 Act]. 
 172. Harling, supra note 22, at 110–13. 
 173. Lord Irvine of Lairg, Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain 
and America, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2001). 
 174. Id.  
 175. Rivka Weill, Evolution v. Revolution: Dueling Models of Dualism, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 
438–39 (2006) (indicating House of Lords prior to the 1832 Act controlled the House of Commons, 
and that, after passage of the 1832 Act, such control was extinguished). 
 176. CANON & MAYER, supra note 88, at 54. 
 177. Peter Baker, For Clinton, Long-Delayed Words and Painful What-Ifs, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 
2001, at A18 (referring to Jones v. Clinton federal civil litigation in Arkansas and indicating a $90,000 
fine). 
 178. Editorial, The Past: Cleansing Clinton, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan 22, 2001, at 12 
(recounting deal reached between Independent Counsel and Clinton in exchange for no further 
criminal prosecution against Clinton). 
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scandal as he pardoned a number of federal criminals in the last hours of 
his term.179 
All but one of the House Managers who prosecuted the President in the 
Senate trial were re-elected.180 In 2000, the country went through the 
closest presidential election in American history, which led some to 
advocate constitutional reform of the presidential electoral process.181 The 
Republican candidate, George W. Bush, won the election with the 
controversial assistance of the United States Supreme Court.182 Likewise, 
in the 2000 federal congressional elections, Republicans retained their 
legislative majority in the House of Representatives, but lost their majority 
in the Senate (50 Republicans to 50 Democrats—deadlock between the 
two parties).183 The Democrats, President Clinton’s political party, did not 
win the various state gubernatorial elections, leaving the Democrats 
without a governing majority in either the “White House, the Senate, the 
House nor a majority of the nation’s governorships for the first time since 
1954.”184 As one journalist in 2000 aptly asserted about President 
Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, Bush assumed the presidency with: 
“No majority[;] No mandate[;] Not even broad public agreement that he 
deserved the prize . . . .”185  
 
 
 179. See Steve Chapman, Pardon Me, But Disgust Over Clinton is Not New, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 
2001, at 17; Karen Masterson, GOP’s Sen. Specter raises 2nd Clinton impeachment/One Democrat 
labels ex-president ‘brain-dead’, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 12, 2001, at 4. For polling statistics evidencing 
the public’s fatigue from the Clinton scandals and possible impacts on the results of the 2000 
presidential election, see Stanley A. Renshon, The Polls: The Public’s Response to the Clinton 
scandals: Part 2: Diverse Explanations and Clearer Consequences, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 412, 
421–26 (2002).  
 180. Edward Walsh, House Impeachment Leaders Are Managing Just Fine, WASH. POST, May 22, 
2001, at A19. 
 181. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Fixing the Electoral College, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2000, at A39. 
 182. Linda Greenhouse, Divining the Consequences of a Court Divided, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
2000, at 4.1. 
 183. Ronald Brownstein, The Presidential Transition: Bush Has Legitimacy, but It’s Fragile; 
Leadership: Most Americans are ready to accept him as president, but 44% think Gore would have 
won a recount, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, at A1. Democrats briefly held the majority in the Senate 
when a Republican, Senator James Jeffords of Vermont, changed his party affiliation to Democrat on 
May 24, 2001. Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/ 
one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2007). Technically, the Democrats held a 
majority in the Senate during a portion of the deadlock period from January 3 to 20, 2001 because the 
Vice President of the United States, a voting member of the Senate in case of a tie vote, was a 
Democrat. However, when the Republican President and Vice President were sworn into office on 
January 20, 2001, the Republicans assumed a majority in the Senate for the same reason. Id. 
 184. Adam Clymer, Democrats Seek a Silver Lining, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, at WK 5.  
 185. David S. Broder, A Weak Hand . . . , WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at B7. 
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Within a year after Clinton left office, America suffered the most 
devastating terrorist attack in United States history.186 This event did much 
to alter the political realities of American government. The nation plunged 
into armed conflict, principally in Afghanistan and Iraq.187 American 
armed forces swept away the ruling factions in both nations, but have yet 
to quell civil unrest in either country.188 The extent to which the Clinton 
impeachment brought about these events is a subject left to historians to 
discover.189 Nonetheless, within this article the terrorist attack is 
considered merely as a historical fact that happened after the episode 
involving President Clinton’s impeachment.  
Following the terrorist attack, the Republicans captured strong 
majorities in both Houses of Congress in the 2002 federal elections.190 The 
Republicans retained congressional power until 2006 when the Democrats 
obtained a legislative majority in both Houses.191 President George W. 
Bush convincingly won a second term in the 2004 election.192  
The extent of the aftermath of the Clinton impeachment is yet 
unknown. American political institutions exist precariously while popular 
disdain for the federal government remains. After Clinton’s impeachment, 
no major public revolt or sweeping reforms of the federal system occurred. 
The only significant legislative response to the impeachment was the 
elimination of the Independent Counsel position.193 Yet, Clinton’s 
impeachment assured future American presidents will reside in office 
more securely than their predecessors because impeachment as a method 
 
 
 186. S. Res. 22, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 222 (2001) (joint resolution regarding terrorist attacks 
launched against the United States on September 11, 2001). 
 187. S. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (authorization for Use of Military Force). 
 188. General David H. Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Sitution in Iraq (2007), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/pet091007.pdf; Statement of Richard A. Boucher, Assistant 
Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee 6–7 (2007), http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2007/BoucherTestimony070308.pdf.  
 189. A recent CNN poll reflects that Americans in 2006 placed blame on both the Clinton and 
Bush Administrations for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. CNN Poll August 30–September 2, 
2006, http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2006/images/09/11/rel21i.pdf (illustrating similar sentiments in polls taken 
in 2001 and 2004).  
 190. STATISTICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 5, 2002 54 (2003), http://clerk. 
house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/2002election.pdf. 
 191. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present), http://clerk.house.gov/ 
art_history/house_history/partyDiv.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2007) (showing in table format party 
divisions in House of Representatives through the 2006 congressional elections); Party Division in the 
Senate, 1789–Present, supra note 183 (showing in table format party divisions in Senate through the 
2006 Congressional Elections).  
 192. STATISTICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2, 2004, http://clerk.house.gov/ 
member_info/electionInfo/2004/Table.htm (first table illustrates results of 2004 Presidential Election). 
 193. CANON & MAYER, supra note 88, at 58. 
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for political change proved unpopular.194 If American history follows the 
Carolinian example, one can expect that great legislative reform is on the 
horizon, that governmental institutions will be substantially altered, and 
that a more viral form of government, more attentive to popular interests, 
will arise.195  
II. LEGAL PROCEDURES AS POLITICAL WEAPONS 
Senator Thomas Daschle, then-Democratic leader in the Senate, 
asserted at the close of the impeachment trial of President Clinton, “[T]he 
law must be preserved as an instrument for the rendering of justice, not 
manipulated to serve as another readily accessible weapon to be used 
against political adversaries.”196 
Echoing the Senator’s assertion, a scholar writing about the Clinton 
impeachment stated impeachment was not meant to be “a weapon for one 
party to destroy a particular President.”197 Senator Richard Durbin noted 
that Thomas Jefferson feared impeachment “could be a formidable 
partisan weapon. He feared that a determined faction in Congress would 
use it ‘ . . . for getting rid of any man whom they consider as dangerous to 
their views . . . .’”198  
Despite the aforementioned statements, legal procedures—
impeachment in the case of Clinton and a Bill of Pains and Penalties in the 
case of Caroline—are utilized as political weapons. First, the rationale 
behind selecting legal procedures as a political weapon for accomplishing 
political change is explored. Second, the success of legal procedures as 
political weapons are discussed in order to evaluate whether selecting the 
law as a weapon for political change is actually effective in achieving the 
desired results.  
 
 
 194. HAROLD H. BUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPERATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 325 (2006) (asserting politicized impeachment deterred by Clinton epidsode); 
Michael J. Gerhardt, Impeachment Defanged and Other Institutional Ramifications of the Clinton 
Scandals, 60 MD. L. REV. 59, 70–72 (2001).  
 195. On the specific reforms enacted in the period immediately following the trial of Queen 
Caroline, see generally A.V. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC 
OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (photo. reprint 1996) (1905). 
 196. S. DOC. NO. 106-4, at 2017 (1999). 
 197. BUSBY, supra note 100, at 213. Another scholar concluded there is a risk “impeachment will 
become a political weapon, one to be used as a kind of substitute for the tasks of running the country 
and making people’s lives better.” Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 
279, 312 (1998). 
 198. S. DOC. NO. 106-4, at 2710 (1999).  
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A. Why Select the Law to Accomplish Political Change? 
Law cloaks an endeavor to ferment political reform in legitimacy, 
which is why legal procedures are an obvious choice for accomplishing 
political transformation.199 The law imposes strict rules for collecting, 
examining, and distributing evidence.200 Actors using law as a weapon 
may coerce their opponent through procedure to adopt positions calculated 
to discredit the adversary. Moreover, the procedural constraints imposed 
by law enable parties to shape information in the manner most calculated 
to achieve maximum persuasive effect.201 
Reference to law permits appeal to authority because the law is steeped 
in tradition.202 Law itself “unites all cases under one ruling principle.”203 
Lawyers are required to implement legal procedures because “[i]f law is 
supreme, their skills are requisite for proper rule.”204 It is true that in both 
the United States and England the majority of “legislators, jurists, and 
governmental executives are lawyers . . . .”205 This fact led one eminent 
scholar to surmise “[i]t was the legal profession—up to the Chief Justice 
[of the United States Supreme Court] himself—that orchestrated this 
profound series of events in America” involving the impeachment and trial 
of President Clinton. 206 
 
 
 199. John Rawls, The Justification of Civil Disobedience, in THE DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW 55 
(William A. Edmonson, ed., 1999). Rawls asserts that “civil disobedience expresses disobedience to 
law within the limits of fidelity to law, and this feature of it helps to establish in the eyes of the 
majority that it is indeed conscientious and sincere, that it is really meant to address their sense of 
justice.” Id. 
 200. This is evidenced by the voluminous amount of transcripts and evidence collected and 
published in the trial of Caroline and the Clinton impeachment. See generally A CORRECT, FULL, AND 
IMPARTIAL REPORT, OF THE TRIAL OF HER MAJESTY, CAROLINE, QUEEN CONSORT OF GREAT 
BRITAIN, BEFORE THE HOUSE OF PEERS; ON THE BILL OF PAINS AND PENALTIES; WITH AUTHENTIC 
PARTICULARS, EMBRACING EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE CONNECTED WITH, AND ILLUSTRATIVE OF, THE 
SUBJECT OF THIS MOMENTOUS EVENT INTERSPERSED WITH ORIGINAL LETTERS, AND OTHER CURIOUS 
AND INTERESTING DOCUMENTS, NOT GENERALLY KNOWN, AND NEVER BEFORE PUBLISHED, 
INCLUDING, AT LARGE, HER MAJESTY’S DEFENCE (J.H. Adolphus ed., William S. Hein & Co. Inc. 
2001) (1820) (reproducing record of trial and evidence submitted); S. DOC. No. 106-4 (1999) 
(excerpting portions of proceedings in House of Representatives and Senate into four volumes). 
 201. See John J. Miller, Argument Efficacy: Evaluating the Public Argument of President Bill 
Clinton’s Impeachment Crisis, 40 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOCACY 226, 231–34 (2004) (describing 
arguments of the parties to the Clinton impeachment and how these statements were structured to 
achieve deliberate ends). 
 202. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of The Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 456, 469 (1897) (declaring 
to know reason for existence of law must refer to tradition). 
 203. HUGH P. MCDONALD, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND IDEOLOGY 144 (1997). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Reflections on Lawyers, Legal Ethics and The Clinton Impeachment, 
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 559, 564 (1999). 
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If lawyers were the cause of the impeachment—and the same may be 
said of the trial of Queen Caroline—then this Article should focus solely 
on lawyers’ use of legal procedures as political weapons.207 Despite the 
abundance of legal talent appearing in the Caroline and Clinton sagas, 
actors in either epoch did not necessarily seek to achieve legal goals, but 
utilized lawful processes to attain overtly political prizes. The Whigs and 
radicals supported the Queen’s cause in hopes of receiving political 
benefits and increased domestic freedoms.208 In the case of Clinton, the 
Republicans sought the removal of the President as a means to achieve 
greater electoral success.209 Couched in law and resulting from legal 
processes, Caroline’s trial and Clinton’s impeachment were not calculated 
uses of legal procedures by lawyers to accomplish legal goals, i.e., 
overturning specific statutes or rules. Instead, parties in both instances 
sought extensive alteration of the political status quo. This is evidenced in 
Caroline’s case by the radicals and Whigs who sought a new political 
order more responsive to populous concerns.210 In Clinton’s case, the 
Republicans sought new legislative authority to implement sweeping 
procedural changes within the Congress and vast changes throughout the 
Nation through their Contract with America.211 Therefore, this Article is 
properly focused on the use of legal procedures by politicians to achieve 
political goals.212 It may be argued, however, that legal procedures are 
never political weapons. Instead, reference to such procedures results from 
the exercise of processes constituted to avert destructive revolution.213 
Hence, liberal democratic society requires citizens to use these lawful 
processes to accomplish political goals, rather than take up arms in bloody 
revolt.214 
 
 
 207. See supra notes 37–41. 
 208. HARRAL, supra note 6, at 25 (Whigs and radicals united in defense of Caroline); HARLING, 
supra note 22, at 104 (Whigs sought King’s patronage and pursued practical reform efforts). 
 209. See RAE & CAMBPELL, supra note 129, at 21.  
 210. See HARLING, supra note 22, at 99, 110 (indicating that radicals called for parliamentary 
reform and universal male suffrage); Lord Irvine of Lairg, supra note 173, at 12–13 (indicating 
populous shift initiated by the Whig sponsored 1832 Act). 
 211. See RAE & CAMBPELL, supra note 129, at 20; Keith E. Whittington, Bill Clinton Was No 
Andrew Johnson: Comparing Two Impeachments, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 422, 450–56 (2000).  
 212. Although some politicians are lawyers, and their preference for legal modes to accomplish 
political ends may result from their familiarity with the law.  
 213. See generally RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1974) 
(tracing English and American legal history relating to impeachments). 
 214. See COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, DEMOCRACTIC RIGHTS THE SUBSTANCE OF SELF-
GOVERNMENT 52 (2007) (indicating liberal democratic citizenship implicates resort to procedure to 
vindicate rights); see generally SANFORD LAKOFF, DEMOCRACY: HISTORY, THEORY, PRACTICE 99–
114 (1996) (describing elements of liberal democracy). 
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Historically, the procedures utilized against Caroline and Clinton were 
established to avert civil armed conflict.215 Used in a proper context these 
legal processes are not political weapons. Rather, it is the deliberate 
selection of law when reliance on legal procedures is not required or 
merited that characterizes such use as political weapons. The Bill of Pains 
and Penalties was not mandated for the purposes expounded by its authors 
against Caroline. As previously discussed, such a Bill’s legal validity was 
questionable in Caroline’s time and in its previous enactments.216 
Similarly, in the Clinton case, there is ample evidence that the mechanism 
of impeachment was not contemplated to be used in situations like the 
factual scenario providing the basis for the impeachment of Clinton.217 
Indeed, most prominent legal scholars detested impeachment in Clinton’s 
circumstances.218 
Legal procedures are also chosen to accomplish political aims because 
law furnishes individuals with means to attack their political opponents 
across a broad spectrum of issues. Much like a civil litigant who may 
plead as many alternative theories in a complaint as are plausible, use of 
legal procedures as political weapons enable users to mount varying and 
substantial assaults regarding multiple political issues.219 In Caroline’s 
case, her trial was used to attack the monarchy, the administration, the 
laws repressing English civil liberties, and social inequities between the 
various social classes of Britain.220 Clinton’s impeachment served to 
vindicate conservative moral opinions, repudiate the exercise of 
presidential powers, dissuade party voters from endorsing similar 
 
 
 215. 2 Records of the Federal Constitution of 1787 67 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) (Randolph 
asserting punishment through impeachment would avert insurrections). 
 216. HARRAL, supra note 6, at 25 (such a bill, resorted to in cases of special emergency, was an 
exception to the common law); SMITH, supra note 1, at 427 (indicating such a Bill an unconstitutional 
and discreditable act). 
 217. Four hundred and forty-three law professors executed a letter to Congress that asserted 
impeachment was improper in Clinton’s situation. 144 CONG. REC. H9649-9650 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 
1998) (letter read into the record and submitted by Rep. Elizabeth Furse); Daniel H. Pollitt, Sex in the 
Oval Office and Cover-Up Under Oath: Impeachable Offense?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 259, 280–82 (1998) 
(concluding after recounting history of Constitution’s impeachment clause and all prior cases of 
impeachment that Clinton’s offences were not of the type considered impeachable); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Defining “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Basic Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 
723–26 (1999) (concluding constitutional history does not support impeachment on facts presented in 
Clinton’s case).  
 218. Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 52-320 (1998) (producing testimony of legal 
experts before House on standard for impeachment). 
 219. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a),(e)(2).  
 220. WADDAMS, supra note 31. 
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candidates, discredit the Democrats ideology and assert legislative 
predominance.  
With such a panoply of criticisms voiced through the legal procedures 
employed, the political party or individuals utilizing legal procedures for 
their own ends are able to present a multifaceted biased assault under a 
cloak of legitimacy provided by legal processes. These procedures supply 
the political actors with clout and permit those wielding law as a weapon 
to broadcast their political message disguised as legal arguments logically 
produced as a result of the procedures employed.221 The format of the 
proceedings legitimizes politically motivated assaults as legal arguments 
supported by the tradition, rules, and substance of law.222 
Caroline’s supporters levied vitriolic attacks against the monarchy and 
administration couched in austere declarations that the Queen’s treatment 
violated English constitutional precepts.223 The procedural format of a Bill 
of Pains and Penalties provided the Queen’s supporters a lawful forum to 
voice opposition otherwise punishable by incarceration for sedition.224 
Similarly, those seeking Clinton’s removal were able to extensively 
expound on the floor of the House, in Committee, and in the well of the 
Senate, the moral and political rationales for Clinton to be removed from 
office.225 The Republicans acquired a bully-pulpit whose audience was the 
entire television-viewing public to proclaim their support of the 
prosecution of a defendant charged with high crimes and misdemeanors.226 
It remains to be discovered whether use of law is an effective method 
to achieve and implement political goals. The following section addresses 
this issue and considers whether, in specific circumstances, lawful 
processes may be justly appropriated by political actors to achieve overtly 
political objectives.  
 
 
 221. See ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 59 (2004) (describing legal system as institutional, 
leading to individual’s perception of results of legal procedures as objective and externally given); 
accord N.M. KORKUNOV, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW 161 (W.G. Hastings trans., Modern Legal 
Philosophy Series 2d ed. 1968) (1922).  
 222. See Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 139, 154 (1984) (asserting respect for law results from belief in obligation to 
obey law because law is individual and communal). 
 223. See ROBINS, supra note 2, at 146–64. 
 224. See David G. Barnum, The Clear and Present Danger Test in Anglo-American and European 
Law, 7 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 263, 265–67 (2006) (describing content of nineteen century law of 
seditious libel). 
 225. See generally S. DOC. NO. 106-4 (1999). 
 226. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (describing standard for impeachment as commission of high 
crimes and misdemeanors, bribery, or treason). 
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B. Are Legal Procedures An Effective Method for Altering Political 
Circumstances?  
To evaluate whether legal procedures are an effective method for 
achieving political aims or altering political circumstances, reference to 
the two examples of Caroline and Clinton is necessary. The trial of 
Caroline did not immediately result in the legislative or power changes 
that the Whigs or radicals hoped for.227 The trial did, however, quiet the 
zeal of the radicals as the King hoped.228 Yet within fifteen years of the 
trial, the opposition party accomplished their reform objectives by 
enacting sweeping legislative and social reforms.229 Hence, in Caroline’s 
case, selection of legal procedures did accomplish the political aims of the 
King effectively. However, the major supporters of the Queen’s trial, the 
radicals and Whigs, did not receive immediate assistance in achieving 
their political goals from the legal procedures employed.230 
Nonetheless, the reforms advocated by the radicals and Whigs were 
eventually implemented and the monarchy greatly lost its political 
authority in the years following the trial.231 It is not a tenuous assertion to 
declare the trial a major motivation for these subsequent events. Therefore, 
the use of legal procedures in Caroline’s example proved immediately 
effective to the King and subsequently effective to other such political 
actors. 
Turning to the Clinton impeachment, the Republicans saw an initial 
setback in the 1998 congressional elections, but regained power in the 
2000 election with George W. Bush assuming the presidency.232 In the 
2002 federal congressional elections their continued success may be 
attributed to the mixed influence of the impeachment and the exemplary 
response to the 2001 terrorist attack by President Bush.233 Therefore, the 
instrumentalities of law as a weapon procured Republicans resounding 
successes in the Clinton case because the Republicans achieved substantial 
 
 
 227. See supra notes 163–66. 
 228. See supra notes 159–70. 
 229. See supra notes 171–74. 
 230. See supra notes 159–70, 171–74. 
 231. See L. Kinvin Wroth, Note for a Comparative Study of the Origins of Federalism in the 
United States and Canada, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 93, 113 (1998) (describing effect of 1832 Act 
as establishing “responsible government” and making the King responsive to the ministers, rather than 
the ministers responsive to the King’s will). See also Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One 
Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 
1096–97 (1994) (describing King’s patronage). 
 232. See supra note 183. 
 233. See supra notes 190–91. 
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political gains: assumption of the presidency and legislative dominance in 
the Congress. 
Objectively, both uses of legal procedure were successes. Yet the 
Carolinian example should only be emulated because the motivations were 
in furtherance of just political and societal transformations. In the 
Carolinian example, the legal procedures were not first proposed by actors 
who later used the processes for ulterior political motivations. The Whigs 
and radicals had no other available effective means to dramatically 
communicate their protests and opinions. Under these or similar 
circumstances, the law was rightly used as a political weapon. 
Citizens may be “apt to think political obligations march in step with 
legal obligations, and this may be a natural assumption since legislation is 
a political process, effected by the sovereign.”234 Legal and political 
obligations should coincide when “there are good moral reasons why we 
should obey the laws promulgated by the state . . . .”235 When an extralegal 
event occurs that threatens laws enacted representing good moral reasons, 
citizens should possess an obligation to defend such laws.236 Moreover, 
realizing moral reasons are quite divergent and individualized, a 
reformulation of the previous assertion may be that citizens are obligated 
to defend laws that protect and preserve their fundamental rights or 
contribute (in the broadest sense) to protection of such rights.237 When 
extralegal events transpire that collectively threaten citizens’ fundamental 
rights, then individuals have an obligation to utilize law in a manner to 
protect these threatened liberties.238 Dogmatic adherence to legal 
procedures is secondary to securing the rights laws are enacted to 
protect.239 As in Caroline’s case, civil liberties were suppressed for no 
reason other than to satisfy the whim of those in power.240 Under these 
 
 
 234. DUDLEY KNOWLES, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 241 (2001). 
 235. Id. Compare id. with H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958) (arguing separation of law from morality).  
 236. For example, Dr. Martin Lurther King, Jr. asserted adherence to the Supreme Court’s Brown 
v. Board of Education decision was necessary, but advocated disobedience to other laws lacking 
similar justification. Martin Lurther King, Letter From a Birmingham Jail, reprinted in JOEL 
FEINBERG & JULES COHEN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 213–21 (8th ed. 2008). 
 237. On the great difference between rights and laws see THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE 92 (Howard 
Warrender, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1983) (1651) (asserting that rights are freedoms and laws are 
fetters).  
 238. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 323–27 (The Law Book Exchange 
2006) (1698) (advocating appeal to law initially to redress grievance with government unless no such 
procedure available). 
 239. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 192 (1978) (asserting citizen possesses 
right to disobey law when law wrongly infringes upon right). 
 240. See supra notes 23–29. 
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circumstances—and only in these situations—is the use of law and its 
concomitant processes justified as a political weapon. 
In condoning employment of legal procedures as a political weapon in 
severely limited occurrences, generalizations advocating such use in trivial 
instances should not follow. Use of legal procedures in situations similar 
to that of the Republicans in the impeachment of President Clinton are 
unwarrented because vital rights of the populous were not in imminent 
peril. Republicans used the guise of law in order to accomplish partisan 
political goals uninfluenced by securing popular rights. Such use is not 
approved and should be avoided. 
It is advocated that law may be used as a political weapon when such 
use furthers essential liberal democratic rights. Furtherance of such rights 
should not be in an effort to eclipse the rights of other groups or minority 
interests. For that matter, wielding law as a political weapon should not be 
aimed at creating anarchy or armed civil conflict, but should be reserved to 
those extreme instances where necessity requires reference to legal 
procedures in vindication of underlying suppressed or restricted rights. 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
History is replete with the unheeded warnings of one generation to 
another. Let the accounts of Queen Caroline and President William 
Jefferson Clinton warn the next generation against the use of law and its 
mechanisms for unsavory motives and preserve such processes for 
legitimate and necessary causes. It is deference, not to law itself but to the 
principles underlying law, that is required. Citizens must recognize the 
meaning of the law, rather than the endless rules that ensure and protect 
the root of such procedures. If a citizenry adheres to the fundamental 
precepts upon which liberal democratic law is founded on, then the 
populace shall refrain from utilizing legal procedures as political weapons 
in furtherance of unjust causes. 
Thus, the purpose of this article is to ensure recognition of future uses 
of legal procedures as political weapons in service of base political causes. 
Prevention of political appropriation of law as a weapon requires public 
vigilance. When citizens protect the sanctity of legal procedures from 
encroachment, they ensure law serves as a tool in sustaining liberal 
democratic freedoms.  
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